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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF
BATTERED CHILD SYNDROME TO
PROVE INTENT
Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Estelle v. McGuire,I the United States Supreme Court held that
a state court's admission of evidence of prior injuries to an abused
child was constitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, even though those injuries could not be attrib-
uted to the defendant. The Court found that this evidence was
relevant to prove "battered child syndrome," a medical diagnosis
which uses proof of past injuries to show that a child's present inju-
ries did not occur accidentally.2 According to the Court, the prior
injury evidence helped to prove that the child's present injuries
were the result of the defendant's intentional act because it showed
that the injuries were intentionally inflicted by someone.3 In addition,
the Court upheld the trial court's jury instructions on the prior in-
jury evidence, despite the defendant's protestations that the instruc-
tions magnified the prejudicial impact of that evidence. 4 Applying
the "reasonable likelihood" test of Boyde v. California,5 the Court
concluded that there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury ap-
plied the instruction in a way that violated the Constitution. 6
This Note argues that the Court, by failing to clearly distinguish
between the prior injury evidence and the battered child syndrome
diagnosis, provided a misleading and simplistic analysis of the evi-
dentiary questions presented. While battered child syndrome is
1 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991).
2 McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Landeros v. Flood,
551 P.2d 389, 393 (Cal. 1976); People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 506 (4th Dist.
1971).
3 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 480.
4 Brief for Amici Curiae the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and
the National Legal Aid and Defender Association Supporting Respondent at 21, 112 S.
Ct. 475 (1991) (No. 90-1074) [hereinafter Brief Supporting Respondent].
5 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
6 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 484.
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purely a medical diagnosis, 7 evidence of past injuries is actually evi-
dence of the defendant's prior bad acts, the consideration of which
may lead the jury to improperly infer that the defendant has a pro-
pensity or a character trait for committing wrongful acts. This Note
argues that the prior injury evidence was wrongly used to prove in-
tent because it was not linked to the defendant in a meaningful way
and its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudi-
cial effect. Further, this Note argues that Justice O'Connor, in her
dissent to Part II of the Court's opinion, correctly asserted that the
jury instruction on the prior injury evidence allowed the jury to mis-
use that evidence, rendering the trial fundamentally unfair. Finally,
this Note suggests that the Court's decision reflects a result-ori-
ented approach to evidentiary questions that poses a dangerous
threat to the time-honored prohibition against character evidence.
II. BACKGROUND ON BAT=ERED CHILD SYNDROME
Child abuse, although a horrifying social epidemic, is a difficult
crime to prove. The victim, if alive, is often too young or lacks the
psychological capacity and/or the courage to testify.8 Of those chil-
dren who take the stand, some, due to their age, are ineffective wit-
nesses. 9 Further, the prosecution can rarely find an eyewitness to
testify, and the accused is often able to fabricate a plausible explana-
tion for the child's injuries. 10 The resulting evidentiary void is com-
pounded by the fact that many jurors are unable to accept the idea
that a parent or guardian would intentionally hurt a child." I More-
over, in many instances, there exists very little physical evidence of
the abuse. 12
In response to these problems, prosecutors have turned to ex-
pert medical testimony.' 3 Today, physicians may be allowed to tes-
tify as to whether the injured child shows signs of "battered child
syndrome," a medical diagnosis based on evidence indicating that
the child has been subjected to a pattern of serious and unexplained
7 John E.B. Myers, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child Abuse Litigation, 1988 UTAH
L. REV. 479, 537.
8 Michael S. Orfinger, Battered Child Syndrome: Evidence Of Prior Acts In Disguise, 41 FLA.
L. REV. 345, 346 (1989); Myers, supra note 7, at 479-80.
9 Myers, supra note 7, at 480.
10 Orfinger, supra note 8, at 346; Myers, supra note 7, at 480.
11 Orfinger, supra note 8, at 346.
12 This lack of physical evidence is particularly a problem when the accused is
charged with sexual abuse, because such abuse seldom results in physical injury. Myers,
supra note 7, at 480.
13 Orfinger, supra note 8, at 346.
1993] 895
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
abuse.14 The term "battered child syndrome" was coined by Dr. C.
Henry Kempe and his colleagues in a landmark article published in
1962.15 The syndrome does not establish the culpability of any par-
ticular person; rather, it simply indicates that a child found with seri-
ous, repeated injuries has not suffered those injuries by accidental
means. 16 Evidence of battered child syndrome is used to make the
logical inference that only someone who is regularly caring for the
child would have occasion to inflict these types of injuries, as an iso-
lated act by a stranger would not result in a pattern of successive
injuries over an extended period of time.17 Thus, evidence of bat-
tered child syndrome tends to narrow the group of possible child
abusers in a criminal proceeding.
Under California law, the prosecution may attempt to prove
battered child syndrome through the introduction of expert testi-
mony and evidence related to a child's prior injuries.1 8 People v.
Jackson19 is the first case in which such evidence was given appellate
approval. In Jackson, the court affirmed a conviction of child abuse,
holding that it was not error for the trial court to have allowed a
doctor to testify that the child suffered from battered child syn-
drome.20 The court listed several indicators of the syndrome. First,
the child is usually under three years of age. Second, there is evi-
dence of bone injury at different stages of healing. Third, there are
subdural hematomas with or without skull fractures. Fourth, there
is a seriously injured child who does not have a medical history that
readily explains the injuries. Fifth, there is evidence of soft tissue
injury. And finally, there is evidence of neglect. 2'
The Jackson court opined that the battered child syndrome had
become an accepted medical diagnosis. 22 Subsequent decisions
have confirmed the court's dictum. Since its emergence, expert tes-
timony on the battered child syndrome has been held admissible in
14 Id. at 346-47.
15 Id. (citing Dr. C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 17
(1962)).
16 Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480 (1991); see also Landeros v. Flood, 551 P.2d
389, 409 (Cal. 1976); People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 506 (4th Dist. 1971).
17 Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d at 507.
18 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. 475 at 480.
19 18 Cal. App. 3d at 506-08.
20 Id. at 508.
21 The physician in Jackson found all of these indicia to be present in the victim's
history. This led the doctor to remark that "it would take thousands of children to have
the severity and number and degree of injuries that this child had," over the span of
time in which he had them, by accidental means. Id. at 506-07.
22 Id. at 507.
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every jurisdiction that has considered such evidence.23
III. SUMMARY OF FACTS
On the night of July 7, 1981, Defendant-Respondent Mark
Owen McGuire and his wife brought their six-month-old daughter,
Tori, to the emergency room of a California hospital.24 The baby
was bluish in color, was not breathing, and had no vital signs.25 She
had a large and relatively recent bruise on her chest with multiple
bruises around it, as well as black and blue marks on her ears.26 The
doctors were unable to revive Tori, and she died forty-five minutes
after being brought to the hospital.27 An autopsy revealed seven-
teen contusions on her chest, twenty-nine contusions in her abdomi-
nal area, a split liver, a split pancreas, a lacerated large intestine, and
damage to her heart and one of her lungs. 28 In addition, the au-
topsy uncovered evidence of rectal tearing at least six weeks old and
several partially healed rib fractures approximately seven weeks
old.29
The police questioned McGuire and his wife, Daisy.30 McGuire
initially stated that Tori's injuries were caused by a fall from the
family's couch. 31 He told the police that while his wife was out, he
left his daughter on the couch and went upstairs; he later heard Tori
crying and came back downstairs to find her lying on the floor.3 2
When a police officer challenged this explanation, McGuire re-
sponded that "maybe some Mexicans came in" while he was up-
stairs. 33 During separate questioning, McGuire's wife said she had
not hit Tori and did not know whether McGuire had done so.3 4
Daisy McGuire also told a detective that she had noticed bruises on
Tori's body during bathings. When asked how Tori might have got-
ten those bruises, Daisy responded that she didn't know and stated,
23 Orfinger, supra note 8, at 347.
24 Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 478 (1991); McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d 749,
751 (9th Cir. 1990).
25 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 478; McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d at 751.
26 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 478.
27 Id." The doctors felt they had a chance to resuscitate Tori because, upon her arri-
val, irreversible brain swelling had not yet begun. This indicated that she had been
beaten very recently. McGuire v. Estelle, 919 F.2d 578, 584 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski,J.,
dissenting).









"I am not the only one who is taking care of [Tori].... My husband,
too, takes care of her."
3 5
McGuire was charged with second-degree murder.3 6 At trial,
the prosecution introduced the statements McGuire made to the po-
lice, as well as medical evidence that included both the rectal tear-
ing 37 and the rib fractures.38 There was no direct evidence linking
McGuire to these prior injuries.3 9 Nevertheless, two physicians re-
lied on these injuries, as well as the more recent injuries, in testify-
ing that Tori was a battered child.40 The doctors further testified
that the injuries that caused Tori's death could not have been pro-
duced by a fall from the couch.
41
The prosecution also called a witness who overheard a conver-
sation between McGuire and his wife in the emergency room of the
hospital. 42 The witness testified that Daisy McGuire had repeatedly
asked her husband "what really happened," and at the end of the
conversation had blamed him for Tori's death.43 In addition, Mc-
Guire's neighbor testified that the defendant had treated Tori
roughly in the past.4 4 According to her, McGuire had carried the
baby to the car by "one of her arms," had pinched her cheeks when
she cried, and had done other "bad things." 45 The witness further
stated that McGuire's wife, a "very caring mother," had expressed
fear at leaving Tori alone with McGuire.
46
35 McGuire v. Estelle, 919 F.2d 578, 584 n.7 (9th Cir. 1990) (KozinskiJ., dissenting).
36 Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 478 (1991).
37 The examining physician, Dr. Levine, testified that the rectal tear was not caused
by constipation or fecal impactment. Rather, the scarring around Tori's anus probably
resulted from the forceful insertion of a finger or some other object. McGuire v. Estelle,
902 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1990).
38 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 478.
39 Id. at 480. McGuire made timely objections to all evidence of prior injuries; all
such objections were overruled by the court. McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d at 751.
40 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 478.
41 McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d at 751-52.
42 Id. at 751.
43 ChiefJustice Rehnquist described the testimony as follows: "According to the wit-
ness, McGuire's wife several times insistently asked, 'What really happened?' McGuire
replied that he 'didn't know,' and that he 'guessed' the baby fell off the couch. His wife
continued to press for an answer, stating, 'I am very patient. I can wait a long time. I
want to know what really happened?' Finally, she told McGuire that 'the baby was al-
right when I left. You are responsible.'" Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 479. McGuire apparently
made no reply to this last statement. McGuire v. Estelle, 919 F.2d 578, 583 (9th Cir.
1990) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
44 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 478-79.
45 Id.; McGuire v. Estelle, 919 F.2d at 584 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).




Daisy McGuire was called as a witness for the prosecution.47
Under a grant of transactional immunity, she surprisingly testified
that she, and not her husband, had beaten the baby.48 According to
Daisy's confused testimony, she struck Tori on the afternoon ofJuly
7, 1981, before her husband arrived home; the baby did not move,
cry, or cough thereafter.49 She then left the house for ten minutes
and returned to find that the baby was not breathing.50 At that time,
McGuire informed her that Tori had fallen from the couch and
struck the walker.5 1
McGuire's wife was ultimately unconvincing.52 After deliberat-
ing for three days, the jury convicted McGuire of second-degree
murder.55
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The California Court of Appeal affirmed McGuire's convic-
tion. 54 The court concluded that the evidence of prior rib and rectal
injuries was properly admitted to establish "battered child syn-
drome." 55 The California Supreme Court denied McGuire's peti-
tion for review without any citation or comment.56
McGuire then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)57 in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California. 58 After ruling that McGuire had ex-
hausted his state remedies, the court denied his petition, holding
47 Estele, 112 S. Ct. at 479.
48 Id.
49 Id.; McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1990).
50 McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d at 751-52.
51 McGuire's wife also testified that several weeks prior to Tori's death, she inserted
her finger in the baby's rectum in an effort to relieve her of constipation. Id. at 752.
52 Judge Kozinski described Mrs. McGuire's testimony as "halting and tentative,
marked by evasion and lapses of memory, . . . internally inconsistent, contradicted by
her earlier statements to the police and at the preliminary hearing and by Mr. McGuire's
own statements to the police, and inconsistent with the weight of the medical evidence."
McGuire v. Estelle, 919 F.2d 578, 584 (9th Cir. 1990) (KozinskiJ., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
53 Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 486 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). McGuire did not testify on his own behalf. McGuire v. Estelle,
902 F.2d at 752.
54 Estelle 112 S. Ct. at 479.
55 Id
56 McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d 749, 752 (9th Cir. 1990).
57 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1966) reads: "The Supreme Court, ajustice thereof, a circuit
judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States."
58 Estlle, 112 S. Ct. at 479.
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that both the admission of prior injury evidence and the jury in-
struction related to that evidence were proper. 59 The court further
found that this evidence was relevant to contradict McGuire's state-
ment, offered by the prosecution at trial, that Tori's injuries were
caused by a fall from the couch.
60
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and
granted McGuire habeas corpus relief.61 The court ruled that the
admission of the prior injury evidence constituted a deprivation of
due process because the evidence was not connected to the defend-
ant and no claim was made at trial that the baby died accidentally. 62
In addition, the court held that the trial court's jury instruction was
erroneous because it allowed the jury to find McGuire guilty based
simply on a determination that he had committed prior bad acts. 63
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether either the admission of the prior injury evidence or the trial
court's jury instruction on that evidence rose to the level of a due
process violation.
64
V. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, ChiefJustice Rehnquist 65 reversed the
decision of the Ninth Circuit and held that neither the admission of
the prior injury evidence nor the instruction as to its use violated
McGuire's federal due process rights. 66 In so holding, the Court
ruled for the first time that evidence of battered child syndrome can
be properly admitted to show that a child's death was the result of
an intentional act. Part I of the opinion addresses the question of
whether the admission of the prior injury evidence justifies habeas
relief.6 7 Part II examines the constitutionality of the trial court's
59 McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d at 752.
60 Id.
61 See McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d at 751.
62 Id.
63 The Ninth Circuit found that, "The trial court instructed the jury to use [highly
prejudicial] evidence in the most improper way possible .... [The instruction] permits
the jury to make a direct determination of guilt by concluding that appellant committed
prior bad acts." Id. at 754-55.
64 Estelle v. McGuire, 111 S. Ct. 1071 (1991).
65 Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
White, Blackmun, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souterjoined. Justices O'Connor and Stevens
concurred in Part I of the opinion, but dissented to Part II. Justice Thomas took no part
in the decision.
66 Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 484 (1991).




The majority began by defining the Court's scope of review in
examining state court decisions. Chief justice Rehnquist restated
the Court's position that "it is not the province of a federal habeas
court to reexamine state court determinations on state law ques-
tions."' 69 As such, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was wrong to
partially rely on its conclusion that the prior injury evidence was im-
properly admitted under California law.70 When conducting habeas
review, a federal court is confined to deciding whether a state con-
viction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.
7'
Chief'Justice Rehnquist then addressed the question of whether
the admission of the prior injury evidence violated McGuire's due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.72 The Court ex-
plained that evidence of battered child syndrome serves two func-
tions: first, it helps to prove that the child died at the hands of
another and not, for example, by falling off a couch, and second, it
shows that the "other," whoever it might be, inflicted the injuries
intentionally. 73 Thus, evidence showing battered child syndrome is
relevant to establish that certain injuries are the product of child
abuse, rather than accident, even though such evidence does not
purport to prove the identity of the person who inflicted those inju-
ries. 74 The Court noted that since the prosecution had charged Mc-
Guire with second-degree murder, it had the burden of proving that
Tori's death was caused by McGuire's intentional act.75 According
to Chief Justice Rehnquist, proof that Tori was a battered child
helped to do this by demonstrating that her death was caused by the
intentional act of someone. 76 Regardless of whether the evidence
could be linked to McGuire, it "was probative on the question of the
68 Id at 481-84.
69 Id. at 480. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) ("federal habeas
corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law").
70 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 480. The Court of Appeals wrote: "The trial court incorrectly
admitted the evidence pursuant to California law allowing past injury evidence to establish
the 'Battered Child Syndrome.'" McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1990)
(emphasis added).
71 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 480.
72 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that the states shall not "deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
73 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 480.
74 Id.; see also People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291 (Cal. 1984); People v.Jackson, 18 Cal.
App. 3d 504 (4th Dist. 1971).
75 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 480; see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187-189 (West 1988) (malice
aforethought is the requisite intent for second-degree murder).
76 ChiefJustice Rehnquist felt this argument had escaped the Court of Appeals. The
Ninth Circuit stated that "evidence cannot have probative value unless a party connects
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intent with which the person who caused the injuries acted." 77
Next, the majority addressed the defendant's argument that the
prior injury evidence was unnecessary because the defense did not
claim that Tori's death was accidental. It was the prosecution, not
the defense, who introduced McGuire's pretrial statement that the
baby fell off the couch.78 The defense's theory was that Daisy Mc-
Guire deliberately beat her daughter.79 Nevertheless, the Court rea-
soned that the prosecution was not relieved of its burden to prove
all of the essential elements of second-degree murder by the de-
fendant's tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the
offense.80 By eliminating the possibility of accident, the battered
child syndrome evidence was probative of intent. And, according to
the Chief Justice, "nothing in the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment requires the State to refrain from introducing
relevant evidence simply because the defense chooses not to contest
the point. 8 1 The Court thus held that McGuire's due process
rights were not violated by the admission of the prior injury
evidence.8
2
The majority then turned to the question of whether the trial
court's jury instruction caused the jurors to misuse the battered
child syndrome evidence in a way that violated McGuire's due pro-
cess rights.83 The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the De-
fendant committed acts similar to those constituting a crime other
than that for which he is on trial. Such evidence, if believed, was not
received, and may not be considered by you, to prove that he is a per-
son of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes.
Such evidence was received and may be considered by you only for the
limited purpose of determining if it tends to show three things:
it to the defendant in some meaningful way." McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d 749, 753 (9th
Cir. 1990).
77 Estelle, 112 S.Ct. at 480.
78 Brief Supporting Respondent, supra note 4, at 20.
79 McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d at 754.
80 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 481; see Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 64-65 (1988)
("A simple plea of not guilty puts the prosecution to its proof as to all elements of the
crime charged").
81 Estele, 112 S. Ct. at 481; see Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967) ("Cases
in this Court have long proceeded on the premise that the Due Process Clause guaran-
tees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial.... But it has never been
thought that such cases establish this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation
of state rules of criminal procedure") (citations omitted).
82 Having found the prior injury evidence to be relevant, the Court did not reach the
question of whether the Due Process Clause is violated by the admission of irrelevant




1. The impeachment of Daisy McGuire's testimony that she had no
cause to be afraid of the Defendant,
2. To establish the battered child syndrome, and
3. Also a clear connection between the other two offenses and the
one of which the Defendant is accused, so that it may be logically
concluded that if the Defendant committed other offenses, he also
committed the crime charged in this case.
For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence,
you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in
the case. You are not permitted to consider evidence for any other
purpose.8
4
McGuire argued that the above instruction told the jury to find that
he had caused the rib and rectal injuries, despite any evidence of
this.8 5 McGuire further argued that the instruction was a propensity
instruction, allowing the jury to mistakenly base its finding of guilt
on a belief that he had previously harmed Tori and thus had a dispo-
sition to do so. 86
Before addressing these contentions, the Court laid out its stan-
dard of review. According to the majority, an opinion that the trial
court erred under California law would not dictate a reversal of Mc-
Guire's conviction.8 7 The only question facing the Court was
"whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial
that the resulting conviction violates due process. s88 Furthermore,
the Court said it must view the challenged instruction in light of the
trial record and the jury instructions as a whole; it could not be
viewed in "artificial isolation."8 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist then ap-
proved of the "reasonable likelihood" standard for reviewing am-
biguous jury instructions.90 Under this standard, the Court
evaluates "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has
applied the challenged instruction in a way" that violates the
Constitution. 9 1
Applying the reasonable likelihood test, the Court first rejected
McGuire's claim that the trial court's instruction directed the jury to
find that he had caused the prior injuries. 92 ChiefJustice Rehnquist
84 Id. at 479 n.l.
85 Id. at 481.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 482.
88 Id. (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)).
89 Id.
90 Id
91 Id (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990)). The Court reaffirmed the
standard of review for jury instructions set out in Boyde and disapproved the standard of
review language used in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) and Yates v. Evatt, 111 S.
Ct. 1884 (1991). Id. n.4.
92 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 483.
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concluded that this possibility was clearly foreclosed by the inclu-
sion of the words "if the Defendant committed other offenses,"as
this phrase left to the jury the decision as to whether McGuire had
committed the prior acts. 93 The instruction also made clear to the
jury that it was not to use the prior injury evidence as a factor in its
deliberation unless it believed McGuire was the perpetrator of the
earlier injuries. 94 The majority held that to the extent the jury be-
lieved McGuire caused the rib and rectal injuries, there was suffi-
cient evidence to support that conclusion. 95 After all, the Court
reasoned, the battered child syndrome evidence essentially nar-
rowed the group of possible perpetrators to McGuire and his wife;
96
a neighbor had testified as to McGuire's rough treatment of Tori;
and Daisy McGuire had told police that she had observed bruises on
Tori's body in the past.
97
Next, the Court rejected McGuire's argument that even if the
trial court's instruction did not identify him as the perpetrator of the
prior injuries, it was a propensity instruction that allowed the jury to
improperly use McGuire's prior acts against him. While Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist acknowledged that the instruction was ambiguous, he
did not think there was a "reasonable likelihood" that, when read in
the context of other instructions, it authorized the use of propensity
evidence. 98 According to the Court, the more likely reading by the
jury was that if it found McGuire had committed the prior injuries,
and if there was a "clear connection" between those injuries and
the present ones, the evidence of prior injuries could be used to
determine whether McGuire committed the crime charged.99 The
Court stated that this use of evidence of prior offenses paralleled the
familiar use of prior acts to prove intent, identity, motive, and
plan.100 Moreover, the Court found that the trial court specifically
guarded against misuse by advising the jury that the prior injury evi-
dence, if believed, could not be considered to prove that McGuire
"'is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit




96 Id. (citing People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 507 (4th Dist. 1971)).
97 Id. Judge Kozinski added another consideration: one of the injuries to Tori-rec-
tal tearing-is sexual in nature and, in the judge's opinion, of a type more likely to be
made by a man than a woman. McGuire v. Estelle, 919 F.2d 578, 584 n.7 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
98 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 483.
99 Id.
100 Id. See also FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
101 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 483-84.
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not a propensity instruction and that its use did not violate Mc-
Guire's due process rights.
10 2
B. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
Justice O'Connor, joined byJustice Stevens, agreed that the ev-
idence of battered child syndrome was relevant to the issue of in-
tent. 03 Since the State had the burden of proving that McGuire
intentionally killed his daughter, and since Justice O'Connor felt
that the evidence of Tori's battered child status was probative of
causation and intent, Justice O'Connor joined Part I of the Court's
opinion.'0
4
Justice O'Connor dissented to Part II of the opinion because
she felt there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury had misap-
plied the prior acts instruction.'0 5 Justice O'Connor noted the need
for a jury instruction clarifying the limited probative value of the
battered child syndrome evidence, particularly because that evi-
dence was not in any way tied to the identity of the abuser.10 6 She
then pointed out that the trial court's instruction limited the use of
evidence of McGuire's prior bad acts, instead of limiting the use of
evidence of Tori's prior injuries.10 7 In giving such an instruction, the
trial judge himself apparently assumed that McGuire had inflicted
the earlier injuries.10 8 The jury instruction referred to "acts similar
to those constituting a crime other than that for which [McGuire] is
on trial," but it failed to distinguish between the acts for which Mc-
Guire was positively identified, carrying the child by one arm and
roughly pinching her cheeks, and the far more brutal acts for which
no actor was identified, the fractured ribs and rectal tearing. 0 9 Jus-
tice O'Connor felt the grouping of these very different classes of
evidence created a reasonable likelihood that the jury would under-
stand the instruction to mean that McGuire had already been identi-
fied as the prior abuser. 110
Justice O'Connor next argued that Section 3 of the challenged
instruction compounded the trial court's error of implying that Mc-
Guire had been identified as the prior abuser."' The jury was in-
102 Id. at 484.
103 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
104 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108 Id. at 484-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109 Id (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110 Id. at 485 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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structed to "consider" the evidence that McGuire had "committed
acts similar" to the crime charged and then "determine" whether
there was a "clear connection" between the prior acts and the ones
resulting in Tori's death "so that it may be logically concluded that
if the Defendant committed other offenses, he also committed the
crime charged in this case." According to Justice O'Connor, the
trial court did not instruct thejury that it must first "determine" that
McGuire had in fact inflicted the prior injuries before considering
that evidence.' 12 Thus, it was unclear if it was the jury's role to de-
cide whether or not McGuire caused the rib and rectal injuries." 3 It
is reasonably likely that the jury thought McGuire had already been
linked to those injuries and that its role was merely to decide if there
was a "clear connection" between Tori's prior injuries and the inju-
ries that killed her.
114
Justice O'Connor then turned to the question of whether the
jury's possible misapplication of the instruction violated McGuire's
due process rights. She agreed with the majority that the Supreme
Court has narrowly defined the category of infractions that violate
fundamental fairness. 15 However, she argued, the Court has held
that "mandatory presumptions violate the Due Process Clause if
they relieve the State of the burden of persuasion on an element of
the offense."' 16 In Justice O'Connor's opinion, the prior acts in-
struction was a mandatory presumption that did just that. While the
trial court may have intended to allow the jury to infer that whoever
inflicted Tori's past injuries also inflicted the ones that caused her
death, it did not make clear that "the State first had to prove the
predicate facts from which the inference was to be drawn." ' 1 7 Fur-
ther, the wording of the instruction may have convinced the jury
that it had no choice but to "logically conclude" that McGuire mur-
dered his daughter once it found a "clear connection" between the
prior injuries and the fatal ones. 118
Thus, in Justice O'Connor's view, the instruction encouraged
jurors to assume that McGuire had inflicted the prior injuries; it
then directed them to conclude that the prior abuser was the mur-
derer.119 The instruction was reversible error because it relieved
112 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).; see Dowling v. United
States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990).
116 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 485 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117 Id. at 485-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
118 Id. at 486 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
119 Id. at 484 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the State of its burden of proving the identity of Tori's murderer
beyond a reasonable doubt. 120 Justice O'Connor concluded that the
case should be remanded to determine whether the erroneous jury
instruction was harmless.' 21
VI. ANALYSIS
A. BATTERED CHILD SYNDROME USED TO NEGATE ACCIDENT
Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that the prior injury evi-
dence was relevant both to prove battered child syndrome and to
establish the intent of Tori's abuser. However, his opinion fails to
make clear the important distinction between the battered child syn-
drome diagnosis and the prior injury evidence used in making that
diagnosis. The diagnosis of battered child syndrome itself is not ev-
idence of prior bad acts of the defendant; it is a medical opinion,
based upon a physician's perceptions and expertise, that a child has
been seriously and repeatedly beaten. 122 Prior injury evidence may
support this opinion. Such evidence, however, is not opinion testi-
mony but rather, it is uncharged misconduct evidence that threatens
to allow the jury to improperly find that the defendant has a propen-
sity to abuse his or her child.' 23
As the battered child syndrome diagnosis and the evidence of
prior injuries fall into different evidentiary classes, they should be
analyzed differently. In Estelle v. McGuire, the medical diagnosis of
battered child syndrome helped to establish that the child died as a
result of an aggressive human act. No one, including the defendant,
questioned the validity of this diagnosis.' 24 Thus, the question for
the Court regarding actus reus was not whether Tori's status as a bat-
tered child helped the jury to determine the cause of her death; the
real question was whether the prior rib and rectal injuries were rele-
vant to the battered child syndrome diagnosis.
A careful analysis indicates that the rib and rectal injuries were
not needed to establish battered child syndrome or to convince the
jury that Tori's death was non-accidental. There are several reasons
for this. First, the examining physician made her diagnosis that Tori
was a battered child even before she was aware of the prior rib inju-
120 Id. at 486 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121 l (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122 Orfinger, supra note 8, at 347.
123 Admittedly, a prior injury is not actually a prior bad act but is the result of such an
act. However, when evidence of past injuries is used to show motive, intent, identity, or
plan, such evidence is actually prior bad act evidence. Orfinger, supra note 8, at 347.
124 Brief Supporting Respondent, supra note 4, at 19.
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ries. 125 Second, the State's expert was prepared to testify about bat-
tered child syndrome and the lack of an accident without relying
upon the previous injuries. 126 While experts must certainly provide
justification for their opinions, there is no requirement that they tes-
tify to each and every underlying fact. Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, "the expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference
and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying
facts or data. . ,,127 Here, the State's experts could have testified
that Tori was a battered child without disclosing the prior injury evi-
dence. Third, the sheer number and extent of Tori's injuries at the
time of her death essentially precluded the jury from believing that
they were caused by accident. Finally, no defense of accident was
raised at trial. The prosecution attempted to prove that McGuire
intentionally killed Tori, while the defense argued that his wife,
Daisy, intentionally did it.128 The prosecution, not the defense,
made cause of death an issue by introducing McGuire's out-of-court
statement that the baby fell off the couch. 129 Thus, the very diagno-
sis of battered child syndrome was of limited worth.
But, while the prior injury evidence was of limited probative
value to show lack of accident, it cannot be said that the evidence
was irrelevant. The fact that Tori had suffered injuries indicative of
previous beatings did increase the likelihood, to some extent, that
the injuries which caused her death were inflicted intentionally. 130
As the majority points out, "the prosecution must prove all the ele-
ments of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt," and the
evidence of battered child syndrome did aid the prosecution by
eliminating the possibility of accident.' 31 The defense's decision
not to argue that Tori's death was accidental did not relieve the
prosecution of its burden. If the defense had wanted to remove this
issue from the case, it could have stipulated that the child's death
was non-accidental. It chose not to do so, however, and the admissi-
bility of the rib and rectal injuries should not turn on this choice. A
ruling to the contrary would present prosecutors with the dilemma
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 FED. R. EVID. 705; see CAL. EvID. CODE § 802 (West 1965) for the corresponding
state statute ("A witness testifying in the form of an opinion may state on direct examina-
tion the reasons for his opinion and the matter... upon which it is based.") (emphasis
added).
128 McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d 749, 754 (9th Cir. 1990).
129 Brief Supporting Respondent, supra note 4, at 20.
130 FED. R. EVID. 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
131 Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480 (1991).
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identified by Judge Kozinski in his dissent to the Ninth Circuit's
decision:
What are state prosecutors in the Ninth Circuit supposed to do when
presented with a situation such as that here? On the one hand, they
face the possibility of a directed verdict or unfavorable jury instruc-
tions if they fail to prove an element of the case that somehow seems
"obvious." On the other hand, under today's precedent, they face the
possibility that a federal court-with the benefit of hindsight-will
conclude that the evidence was not really necessary because that par-
ticular element of the crime was not contested by the de-
fense .... [E]ven with today's precedent in hand, no prosecutor will
know when to withhold evidence or when to include it until he sees the
defendant's evidence, by which time it will be too late. In common
parlance, this is known as a Catch-22.1
32
Judge Kozinski's argument is persuasive. A tactical decision by the
defense not to challenge an essential element of the prosecution's
case should not render evidence pertaining to that element irrele-
vant. Assuming that the probative value of the rib and rectal inju-
ries outweighed their prejudicial effect, 133 the trial court properly
admitted this evidence to show that Tori's death was not the result
of an accident.
B. PRIOR INJURY EVIDENCE AS PROOF OF INTENT
Admitting evidence to prove the absence of accident, however,
is different from admitting evidence to prove intent on the part of
the defendant. Using prior injury evidence to negate the defense of
accident does not implicate any particular actor (although it may
narrow down the field of possible perpetrators). 3 4 In contrast, us-
ing such evidence to establish the defendant's intent is by definition
accusatory. In child abuse cases, the expert testifying on the exist-
ence of battered child syndrome describes injuries he or she has ob-
served and any further evidence supporting the conclusion that the
child has been beaten by someone. That conclusion, however, is
meaningless unless the prosecution can convince the jury that the
defendant is the expert's "someone."' 13 5 Accordingly, the true pur-
pose of offering battered child syndrome evidence is to prove that
the defendant "committed a series of prior acts, manifested by a se-
132 McGuire v. Estelle, 919 F.2d 578, 581-82 (9th Cir. 1990) (KozinskiJ., dissenting).
133 See infra Part C.
134 Eric D. Lansverk, Comment: Admission of Evidence of Other Misconduct in Washington to
Prove Intent or Absence of Mistake or Accident. The Logical Inconsistencies of Evidence Rule 404(b),
61 WASH. L. REV. 1213, 1229 (1986) ("even anonymous instances of similar conduct can
be probative to negate accident").
135 Orfinger, supra note 8, at 358.
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ries of prior injuries."13 6
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the admissibility of prior
act evidence is governed by Rule 404(b). This rule provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity there-
with. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or malice.
Until recently, most federal courts required that the other crime,
wrong or act be proven by clear and convincing evidence, out of the
hearing of the jury, before the trial court admitted the evidence.13 7
However, in Huddleston v. United States,138 the Supreme Court set
forth a far less stringent standard of proof for the admissibility of
prior act evidence. In Huddleston, the defendant was charged with
the knowing possession and sale of stolen video tapes.' 3 9 At his
trial, the district court allowed the government to introduce evi-
dence of the defendant's involvement in a series of sales of allegedly
stolen televisions and appliances from the same source as the tapes,
on the theory that such evidence was relevant to the defendant's
knowledge that the tapes were stolen.' 40
The Court unanimously held that a trial court need not make a
preliminary finding that the government has proved the prior act by
a preponderance of the evidence before it submits prior act evi-
dence to the jury.14 ' However, writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist also noted that "the Government may [not] parade past
the jury a litany of potentially prejudicial similar acts that have been
established or connected to the defendant only by unsubstantiated
innuendo."142 The ChiefJustice explained that similar act evidence
is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act oc-
curred and that the defendant was the actor. 143 Thus, such evi-
dence, in the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b),
"depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact."' 144
136 Id.
137 Jennifer Y. Schuster, Uncharged Misconduct Under Rule 404(b): The Admissibility of Inex-
tricably Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 947, 961 (1988).
138 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
139 Id. at 682.
140 Id. at 683.
141 Id. at 689.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 FED. R. Evin. 104(b), in its entirety, provides: "When the relevancy of evidence
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or




In Huddleston, ChiefJustice Rehnquist laid out the standard for
determining whether the government has introduced sufficient evi-
dence to meet Rule 104(b): "The court simply examines all the evi-
dence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find
the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence."' 145
Thus, in Huddleston, the threshold question was whether the jury
could reasonably find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
televisions and appliances sold by the defendant were stolen.146 Ac-
cording to the Chief Justice's logic, the question the Court should
have asked in Estelle v. McGuire was whether a jury could reasonably
find that the defendant committed the acts which caused Tori's rib
and rectal injuries.
Applying the Court's holding in Huddleston to the prior rib and
rectal injuries in Estelle v. McGuire reveals that the Court's analysis of
those injuries is flawed. On one hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist
writes that the prosecution was required to show that the baby's
death was the result of McGuire's intentional act.' 47 On the other,
he argues that this goal was furthered by showing that the injuries
were inflicted by the intentional act of someone, even though this
someone might not have been McGuire. 148 The logic here is troub-
ling.' 49 The Court ultimately held that the prior injury evidence was
relevant to prove intent, regardless of whether it was linked to Mc-
Guire.150 In doing so, it apparently ignored the ChiefJustice's own
statement in Huddleston that, "similar act evidence is relevant only if
the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the
defendant was the actor."' 151
Yet in Part II of the majority opinion, the Court considers the
Huddleston prior act standard and concludes that sufficient evidence
existed to sustain ajury finding by a preponderance of the evidence
145 Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690. The ChiefJustice went on to explain how the Court
envisioned the operation of its prior act standard: "Often the trial court may decide to
allow the proponent to introduce evidence concerning a similar act, and at a later point
in the trial assess whether sufficient evidence has been offered to permit the jury to make
the requisite finding. If the proponent has failed to meet this minimal standard of proof,
the trial court must instruct the jury to disregard the evidence."
146 Id.
147 Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480 (1991).
148 Id.
149 Utah v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 542, 553 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(superceded on other grounds by rule in State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987))
("[T]he majority asserts that the battered child syndrome evidence is not accusatory and
only describes the cause of death ... and on the other hand admits that such evidence
incriminates the parents").
150 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 480.
151 Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988); see also United States v.
Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
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that McGuire caused the rib and rectal injuries. 152 Not only does
this analysis seem unnecessary, given the Court's holding, but it is
counter-intuitive, given the facts of the case. The Court bases its
conclusion on three pieces of circumstantial evidence: the battered
child syndrome diagnosis, a neighbor's testimony about McGuire's
"rough treatment" of Tori, and Daisy McGuire's vague explanation
for bruises found on Tori's body.153 In evaluating this evidence,
one must remember that this case basically came down to a jury de-
termination as to which parent inflicted the injuries that killed the
baby. It is also important to note that only one of these parents,
Daisy McGuire, ever admitted to striking Tori on the day that she
died. This fact is important for two reasons. First, it tends to prove
that Daisy McGuire abused her daughter, increasing the likelihood
that she was the person who caused the rib and rectal injuries which
played a role in her husband's conviction. Second, since Daisy was
granted immunity for her testimony, the jury was left with two op-
tions: convict McGuire or allow the crime to go unpunished. 154
Considering the effect of all the circumstantial evidence in this case,
the first option was presumably far more appealing to the jury. Re-
alistically, however, a reasonable jury would have no way of knowing
who caused Tori to suffer the rib and rectal injuries.
The court of appeals recognized this and thus, it ruled that the
circumstantial evidence did not connect McGuire to the prior injury
evidence in a meaningful way. 155 According to the Ninth Circuit,
"[e]vidence of McGuire's petty meanness does not establish that he
committed, or is even capable of, the extensive physical abuse in-
flicted on the child. It is precisely because anyone, including Daisy
McGuire, could have inflicted those injuries that makes the prior in-
jury evidence irrelevant." 156 This reasoning is not only logical, but
it is compatible with the Court's holding in Huddleston.
Support for the Ninth Circuit's decision can be found in two
pre-Huddleston child abuse cases from the Fifth Circuit. In United
States v. Colvin, 157 the defendant sought review of her conviction for
the second-degree murder of her fourteen-month-old daughter. 158
The child was hospitalized with massive head injuries on October 4,
152 Estele, 112 S. Ct. at 483.
153 Id.
154 Justice O'Connor wrote about the dilemma that Daisy McGuire's surprise testi-
mony posed for the jury. Id. at 486 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
155 McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d 749, 753 (9th Cir. 1990).
156 Id. at 753-54.




1977, and she died one week later.159 On May 3, 1978, the defend-
ant admitted to Federal Bureau of Investigation agents and Army
social workers that she had repeatedly struck her daughter's head
against a tile floor approximately ten days prior to the child's
death.160 At trial, the government introduced evidence of rib,
clavicle, and leg fractures which caused the child to be hospitalized
on August 14, 1977.161
The defense challenged the admission of evidence surrounding
the August 14 hospitalization.' 62 The court upheld its admission as
proof of intent because it felt sufficient evidence existed for the jury
to reasonably conclude that the defendant was responsible for the
prior injuries. 163 There were two reasons for this. First, the defend-
ant admitted that she had exclusive control of the child at the time
the prior injuries occurred. 164 Second, the defendant's explanation
of the injuries-that the child's leg was accidentally lodged between
a bed mattress and a footboard-was inconsistent with the injuries
according to the expert medical testimony.' 65 Neither of these rea-
sons for linking the defendant to the prior injuries applied in Estelle
v. McGuire. McGuire and his wife both "cared" for Tori equally, and
McGuire never attempted to explain the rib and rectal injuries.
In Colvin, the court distinguished another child abuse case it
had handed down just three months earlier, United States v. Brown.166
In Brown, the defendant appealed her conviction for assault under
the Assimilative Crimes Act.16 7 On November 16, 1978, she carried
her husband's two-year-old son to a neighbor's home. 168 The child
had a bruised forehead and was unconscious and breathing irregu-
larly, so the neighbor called an ambulance and began mouth-to-
mouth resuscitation.' 69 The child was rushed to the hospital where
emergency surgery saved his life.' 70 The surgeon found a large sub-
dural hemotoma covering the left side of the child's brain and
opined that the injury was caused by a blunt, flat instrument. 171
159 Id
160 Id. at 44-45.
161 Id. at 45.
162 Id.
163 Id Like the Supreme Court in Estelle v. McGuire, the Fifth Circuit cited United
States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), in its analysis.
164 Colvin, 614 F.2d at 45.
165 ld
166 Id.; 608 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1979).
167 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1948).
168 Brown, 608 F.2d at 552-53.





Prior to surgery, the defendant had told her neighbor that while
she was dressing the child, he fell and hit his head on the comer of a
chalkboard. 172 After being shown this chalkboard, the surgeon
stated that this explanation was improbable, and the examining phy-
sician testified at trial that the defendant's explanation was inconsis-
tent with the child's massive bleeding. 173 Over defense objections,
the prosecution also introduced evidence of prior injuries to the
child. 174 Several witnesses testified to his condition on November 2,
1978, when he was brought to the hospital suffering from severe
multiple bruises about his face and body.175 Further, photographs
taken of the child at that time were shown to the jury. 176 However,
the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the injuries of November
2 resulted from the commission of any offense, much less from an
offense committed by the defendant.
177
Brown provides an excellent example of a case where prior in-
jury evidence was properly excluded because it could not be linked
to the defendant. Here, the prosecution failed to establish that "an
offense was in fact committed and the defendant in fact committed
it." 178 Since there was no evidence regarding the November 2 inju-
ries, the court refused to allow the jury the opportunity to infer that
they were caused by the defendant. The Supreme Court should
have adopted a similar stance in Estelle v. McGuire. Since there was
no real evidence linking McGuire to the rib and rectal injuries, the
temptation to find that McGuire caused these injuries should have
been removed from the jury.'
79
C. PROBATIVE VALUE VERSUS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT
"Uncharged misconduct evidence often has dual logical rele-
vance; even when the evidence is relevant on a noncharacter theory,
it also incidentally shows the accused's bad character."' 8 0 Because
of this, courts should not be too receptive to prosecutors' use of
prior acts and uncharged misconduct evidence to prove mens rea.
They should always weigh the probative value of that evidence
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 554.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 555.
178 Id. (quoting United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 912 (5th Cir. 1978)).
179 McGuire v. Estelle, 902 F.2d 749, 753 (9th Cir. 1990).
180 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct to
Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51
OHIO ST. LJ. 575, 593 (1990).
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against its prejudicial effect and the likelihood of abuse by the jury.
This function is typically left to the trial judge and is not performed
on appeal.181 Thus, in Estelle v. McGuire, ChiefJustice Rehnquist did
not take this step. He ended his examination of the evidence once
he determined it to be relevant. Further examination, however,
shows that the prior injury evidence was of tenuous probative value
and was likely to be misused by the jury.
Every state has some provision for excluding relevant evidence
when, in the opinion of the trial court, it does more harm than
good.18 2 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, this provision is em-
bodied in Rule 403, which provides that "evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence."' 1 3 Probative value is determined by
a consideration of several factors: first, the degree of certainty to
which the proponent of the prior act evidence has proved that the
misconduct occurred and that the defendant was the perpetrator;
second, the degree to which the material fact is in dispute; and third,
the availability of other, less prejudicial, evidence to establish the
same fact.'8 4 Applying these factors to the facts in Estelle v. McGuire
indicates that the prior injury evidence Was of little probative value.
As previously discussed, the rib and rectal injuries were connected
to McGuire by only the barest threads of circumstantial evidence.
Further, the need for the prior injury evidence to negate a claim of
accident was obviated by the defense's theory of the case and the
massive injuries to the child. And while intent is a crucial element of
second-degree murder, it is also an element of almost every
crime;'8 5 as such, courts should be wary of espousing a "magic pass-
word approach," by which evidence of prior misconduct is mechani-
cally admitted whenever it is offered to prove intent. 18 6
Given the negligible probative value of the rib and rectal inju-
ries, the trial court was obligated to consider whether the value of
those injuries was outweighed by their prejudicial effect.' 8 7 "Unfair
181 See, e.g., United States v. Derring, 592 F.2d 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 1979) ("We do
not reweigh the value of the material against its potential for harm to the defendant, but
determine only whether the district judge abused his discretion in admitting it.").
182 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1965).
183 FED. R. EvID. 403.
184 Schuster, supra note 137, at 960.
185 Lansverk, supra note 134, at 1221.
186 Id at 1214.
187 In Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988), the Court found that
the protection against unfair prejudice to the defendant came from four sources: first,
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prejudice" within the context of Rule 403 means "an undue ten-
dency to suggest decision on [an] improper basis, commonly,
though not necessarily, an emotional one."' 188 There are two inher-
ent dangers in the admission of prior act evidence that may unfairly
prejudice the defendant by "suggesting decision on an improper ba-
sis." First, the jury may be tempted to punish the accused for the
prior act. This danger may be particularly acute where the prior act
evidence was not the subject of a conviction.18 9 In Estelle v. McGuire,
evidence of the rib and rectal injuries may have left the jury with the
impression that, as of the trial, McGuire had escaped punishment
for his abuse of Tori. The jurors may have been tempted to rectify
that injustice by punishing McGuire for the prior injuries-even
though they may have had reasonable doubts about the identity of
Tori's murderer.190
The second danger in admitting prior act evidence is that the
jury may overestimate its probative value. Jurors are likely to attach
great weight to evidence of prior misconduct in determining
whether the defendant acted "in character" on the occasion of the
charged offense. 19 1 The natural tendency of the human mind is to
judge others on the basis of fragmentary data about their character,
even though character is a relatively poor predictor of a person's
conduct on a given occasion. 192 Thus, the circumstantial evidence
introduced at McGuire's trial may have prompted the jury, first, to
conclude that McGuire had a propensity to abuse his daughter and,
second, to ascribe undue significance to that conclusion in deciding
whether he committed the charged crime.
When considering the likelihood of prejudice in this case, one
must consider how the jury must have reacted to hearing evidence
of such brutal violence inflicted upon an innocent child. Given the
horrifying nature of the rib and rectal injuries, the jury was likely to
have misused the prior injury evidence by basing its decision, at
the prior act evidence must be probative of a material issue other than character; sec-
ond, the evidence must be relevant (i.e., the jury must be able to "reasonably conclude
that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor"); third, the probative value
of the evidence should be weighed against its unfair prejudice; and fourth, the court,
upon request, should instruct the jury that evidence of prior acts may be considered only
for the proper purpose for which it is admitted.
188 United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1265 n.23 (5th Cir. 1988); see also United
States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1987) (Unfair prejudice is measured by a
jury's negative response to the evidence, and is unrelated to its tendency to make a fact
in issue more or less probable.).
189 Zabaneh, 837 F.2d at 1265.
190 Imwinkelreid, supra note 180, at 581.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 581-82.
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least in part, on the illegitimate inferences discussed above; it may
have decided that McGuire should be punished for his prior abusive
acts or that, since he had abused Tori in the past, he probably in-
flicted the injuries which caused her death. The trial court erred by
failing to recognize that the probative value of the prior injury evi-
dence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
D. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent to Part II of the majority opin-
ion, correctly asserted that the trial court's jury instruction on the
prior injury evidence deprived McGuire of his Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process rights. Her opinion identified several problems
with the instruction. First, the instruction limited the use of evi-
dence of McGuire's prior bad acts, rather than limiting the use of
the prior injury evidence. Second, the instruction failed to specify
which prior acts it controlled, grouping acts for which McGuire was
positively identified with the acts which caused the rib and rectal
injuries. These factors combined to create a "reasonable likelihood
that the jury would believe that McGuire had been identified-at
least in the eyes of the trial judge-as the prior abuser."'' 93 Then,
after encouraging jurors to assume that McGuire had inflicted the
prior injuries, the instruction directed them to conclude that the
prior abuser was the murderer. Section 3 of the challenged instruc-
tion told the jury that if it found a "clear connection" between the
prior offenses and the charged offense, "it may be logically con-
cluded that if [McGuire] committed other offenses, he also commit-
ted the crime charged in this case." This instruction violated
McGuire's due process rights because it created a mandatory pre-
sumption that relieved the State of its burden of proving every ele-
ment of its case beyond a reasonable doubt.' 94
When analyzing an ambiguous jury instruction, the Court must
determine whether it creates a mandatory presumption or merely a
permissive inference. 195 "A mandatory presumption instructs the
jury that it must infer the presumed fact if the State proves certain
predicate facts."' 196 In contrast, a permissive inference suggests a
possible conclusion to the jury, but does not require the jury to
193 Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 485 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
194 See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510 (1979).
195 Francis, 471 U.S. at 313-14.
196 Id. at 314.
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draw that conclusion.1 97 Here, the challenged instruction was a
mandatory presumption because it allowed the jury to assume that
whoever committed the prior offenses must have committed the
charged crime. Due to the wording of the instruction, the jury may
have been compelled to find that McGuire killed Tori, once it deter-
mined that there was a "clear connection" between the rib and rec-
tal injuries and the injuries caused by Tori's fatal beating.198
Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with this interpretation. He
argued that the jury was likely to have understood Section 3 of the
instruction to require a two-step analysis: if the jury found a "clear
connection" between the prior injuries and the present injuries, and
if the jury determined that McGuire inflicted the prior injuries, "it
could use that fact in determining that McGuire committed the
crime charged."1 99 There is a reasonable likelihood, however, that
the jury did not understand this instruction to establish a two-step
process. Further, the majority fails to explain how the jury was to
"use" its determination of the prior abuser's identity in determining
whether McGuire committed second-degree murder. If, as the ma-
jority argues, the prior injury evidence was used to establish Mc-
Guire's intent, the jury instruction did not make this clear. Under
the plain language of the instruction, the trial court did not direct
the jury to "use" the prior injury evidence at all. Instead, it directed
the jury to "conclude" that McGuire was guilty if it found that he
had committed prior bad acts. This dramatically reduced the State's
burden of proving that McGuire committed the brutal acts that
killed his daughter.
As such, the jury instruction was inconsistent with the guaran-
tees of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That
clause requires the prosecution to prove every element of the of-
fense beyond a reasonable doubt.200 Since the instruction may have
relieved the State of its burden of proving actus reus, Justice
O'Connor properly argued that the case should have been re-
manded for a determination of whether the erroneous instruction
was harmless. 201
VII. CONCLUSION
In Estelle v. McGuire, the Supreme Court upheld the admission
197 Id.
198 Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 485-86 (1991) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
199 Id. at 483.
200 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
201 Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 486 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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of prior injury evidence to a battered child, even though the injuries
were not linked to the defendant and the trial court's limiting in-
struction encouraged the jury to misuse that evidence in violation of
the defendant's due process rights. In its eagerness to endorse the
battered child syndrome, the Court created a dangerous precedent
for the use of inflammatory character evidence to establish intent.
This decision provides trial judges with tremendous discretion in
admitting highly prejudicial prior act evidence.
The driving force behind the Court's holding is its deference to
state evidentiary law and the Huddleston-inspired lowering of the
standard of proof for preliminary questions of fact. To establish
guilt under federal due process law, the prosecution must prove
each element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. To get prior
act evidence admitted, however, a prosecutor need only convince
the trial judge that, after all the evidence is in, some reasonable jury
could find it more likely than not that the accused committed the
prior act. Reasonable juries, like reasonable minds, may disagree.
As such, only the slightest showing of circumstantial evidence is
needed to reach a threshold at which a reasonable jury could find,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant was the
prior actor. Given the prejudicial nature of prior misconduct evi-
dence, the Court should rethink its "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard. Otherwise, "the terms 'intent' and 'absence of...
accident' may continue to be used solely as labels to justify predeter-
mined admission decisions. ' 20 2
DAVID J. DOYLE
202 Lansverk, supra note 134, at 1219.
19931 919
